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"The working of a juryman's mind is the unknown quantity, the
missing link, in the trial of legal cases. Lawyers may have access
to magnificient libraries, may have legal and other experts
available for consultation at all times, but they cannot have a
knowledge of... how counsel's efforts are to be received by a
jury." This observation was made in a 1922 book titled IMPRESSIONS OF AN AVERAGE JURYMAN.** Despite the intervening sixty
years, the statement is an apt description of the dilemma confronting today's trial attorney. The success of the attorney's endeavor
depends largely on his ability to communicate the merits of his
client's case to twelve (or six) persons who sit in a jury box and
listen. The typical attorney, however, never has an opportunity to
observe jurors discussing and deciding a case; thus, he has only
the roughest bits of information upon which to base a constructive criticism of his jury advocacy skills.
Why is it so difficult for attorneys to understand how juries will
respond to their efforts? The voluminous social science literature
on jury psychology and group decision-making contains a great
deal of important information, but such information inevitably
has important limitations. No two juries are alike; no matter how
extensively the jury's decision-making process is studied, the
most that can be learned is the probability that a particular jury
will act in a certain way. Also, since jury deliberations are secret,
studies of jury behavior are necessarily based on recollection,
which is likely to be incomplete, skewed, and deficient for many of
the same reasons hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible.
© 1983, by The American Journal of Trial Advocacy.
* The author expresses his appreciation to David, Emil, Larry, and Laurence
for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. Unfortunately, these gentlemen
must also remain anonymous. Readers who wish to correspond with the author
may do so by addressing a letter to "Anonymous Juror," c/o The American Journal of Trial Advocacy.
** R. Sutliffe, IMPRESSIONS OF AN AVERAGE JURYMAN 5 (1922).
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Direct observation of jury decision-making is impossible without
tainting the quality of the observations, and perhaps the jury's
decision itself. Another reason for the difficulty attorneys have in
understanding how juries will respond to their efforts is lack of experience. Because attorneys rarely serve on juries, the typical attorney cannot converse with colleagues about personal observations of how juries decide cases.
It is probably fair to say that I am one of only a few lawyers who
has served on a jury. My own recollections of my service may well
be incomplete, skewed, and deficient. Generalizations from my
recollections must be made cautiously, since each jury is different,
and, as the saying goes, "the plural of anecdote is data." Nevertheless, I am in a position to comment from a lawyer's perspective
upon what occurred in the jury room in one criminal case, and I
will do so.
I will remain anonymous, however. I volunteer only that my experience includes clerking for an appellate judge, teaching in a law
school, and practicing with a law firm whose principal business
was litigation. By writing with anonymity, I can be candid about
the performance of the attorneys and the judge, about my impressions of the defendant, and about what I saw and heard without
embarrassing any of the participants in the trial. I will use fictitious names, and I will take the liberty of disguising events
where I can do so without altering the essence of the events which
engendered my impressions.
The Incident
A number of facts were undisputed. On December 27, 1982,
John Doe, accompanied by his brother who was home on leave
from the Army, visited a local nightspot in Leeville to have a few
drinks. After Doe and his brother had each consumed two
cocktails, a waitress came to their table and asked if they wanted
another round of drinks. Doe playfully replied, "I will have a
whiskey sour if it is on the house." The waitress said that a drink
on the house was not possible. Doe gave the same response the
next few times the waitress stopped at Doe's table.
Eventually, to Doe's surprise, a whiskey sour was delivered to
the table, but Doe refused to accept it claiming that he had not
ordered it. The waitress told him he would have to pay for the
drink since she understood he had ordered it and it was already
poured. When Doe refused either to accept or pay for the drink,
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the waitress went to get the manager, a woman in her mid-thirties.
While the waitress was summoning the manager, Doe had a
change of heart about paying for the drink. He drank the whiskey
sour quickly, proceeded to the cashier's window near the bar's exit, and paid for the drink. He was standing by the window, holding
a goblet filled with ice, when the manager, not knowing that the
drink had been paid for, confronted Doe.
What transpired after this moment was disputed. But after
these events it was undisputed that the goblet lay shattered on
the floor and the manager, the right side of her face bleeding from
serious cuts, stood near the exit. Doe and his brother, the only
blacks in a white-patronized bar, fled the scene. They split up, and
Doe was apprehended in a wooded area about three blocks from
the bar. Doe was charged with aggravated battery, which includes
the lesser offense of battery.
Jury Selection
In Troy County, where Leeville is located, every two months approximately 120 registered voters are randomly selected to form a
jury panel. The panel is divided into two groups, one of which
reports to the Court House every Monday a jury trial is scheduled
and the other which does likewise on Wednesdays. For each
criminal trial between twenty and thirty-six members of the group
are randomly selected and empaneled as a jury. The number of
jurors empaneled depends on the seriousness of the charge. During voir dire, observed by all jurors whether or not empaneled, a
juror who is struck for cause is replaced by another juror, again
randomly chosen from those remaining. After voir dire is completed and the empaneled jury is passed for cause, each attorney
is allowed between four and twelve peremptory challenges,
thereby reducing the size of the jury to twelve.
I was one of twenty-four jurors empaneled for the case of State
v. Doe. Mr. Smith, the prosecutor, directed his questions to all the
jurors; if a juror acknowledged that he knew a particular person or
had a certain experience, the prosecutor pursued the matter with
questions directed to that juror. Always, the last question in the
colloquy was whether this experience or knowledge would prevent
the juror from giving both the defendant and the State a fair trial.
Usually, the answer was "no." I was personally acquainted with
Mr. Smith and knew well one of the partners with Mr. Williams,
the defendant's attorney. During voir dire, Mr. Smith asked me to
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explain for the record the nature of these acquaintances, which I
did. I also stated, in response to Smith's questions, my belief that
I could decide the case fairly notwithstanding these acquaintances.
Mr. Williams' general questions evoked no response from me
which required any follow-up inquiry. Finally, at the end of his
voir dire, Mr. Williams said, "Mr. Anon, you're a prof at the Big
U., correct?" I said "That is correct." Continuing, he asked, "Will
that prevent you from being a fair juror?" When I answered "No,"
he asked, "Will you be able to listen to the evidence? Or will you
watch the attorneys and judge us and tell the other jurors all the
things we did wrong?" I replied, "Mr. Williams, you and I both
know that I am different from anyone else in this box. I can't tell
you that I won't note your mistakes and Mr. Smith's, or the
things you do well. But I believe I can be a fair juror."
I was surprised neither Mr. Smith nor Mr. Williams used a
peremptory challenge on me. After being struck from a jury
earlier in my jury service, I learned that it was a "rule" in the prosecutor's office to use peremptory challenges against any lawyer
remaining after a jury was passed for cause. As it was explained
to me, Mr. Smith felt that, as a general rule, a lawyer would be
more likely to perceive a technical weakness in the State's case
and convince the jury to acquit on that basis. Why Mr. Smith
made an exception to his rule for me, I do not know. I can surmise,
however, why Mr. Williams did not strike me. John Doe, a prominent senior at the "Big U," was a defensive halfback on the
school's football team.
A few of the jurors were dismissed for cause. One white man admitted that he could not give a black person a fair trial. A woman
who had been the victim of an assault doubted that she could
judge the defendant fairly. Two of the jurors knew family
members of one of the witnesses and both said that they would be
biased in favor of those witnesses' testimony. One juror had a
fever of 103 degrees and was dismissed. Another juror, a student,
was concerned about getting ready for exams; the judge bade her
farewell and good luck.
One man knew personally a police officer who would testify, but
he thought he could judge the evidence fairly. He was not struck
for cause, but one of the attorneys, presumably Mr. Williams,
used a peremptory challenge on him. Two of the jurors were acquainted with Doe while students at Leeville High School. One of
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these jurors, a white male about twenty-two years old, remained
after the peremptory challenges. One friendly loquacious black
man in his mid-fifties, who admitted he had been in trouble
himself as a youth but who now used his free time to counsel
troubled juveniles, mentioned he was acquainted with Doe's
father but he was not struck.
After peremptory challenges, seven men and five women, eleven
whites and one black, were left. Two were under thirty years of
age, none were over sixty-five, with the remaining jurors being
middle-aged. The jurors' occupations, disclosed on the juror questionnaires, were known only by the lawyers. I gathered that one
woman was a dressmaker; the young man who knew Doe in high
school worked in an ice cream shop; one woman was a student.
One man carried several ink pens in his pocket, and I suspected
him to be an engineer. The jury was obviously predominately
middle-class and employed. No doubt, the oddest juror was the
lawyer.
The Trial
When the trial was ready to begin, all but the prosecutor were
present. The defendant, with the serious demeanor he would maintain throughout the trial, waited nervously. The conservative
sport coat he wore seemed intended to hide his six-foot two-inch,
190-pound frame. Doe's mother and younger brother sat attentively, as they would for the entire trial, in the first row of seats
behind the bar. When the prosecutor arrived about ten minutes
later, he apologized to the judge and jury. No one except me
seemed bothered by his tardiness, although Mr. Williams did
fidget noticeably during the delay. Rather than examine his wristwatch to check the time, Mr. Williams made sweeping turns in his
swivel chair to check the clock on the wall in the back of the courtroom.
The opening statements were short and simple. Both attorneys
made their comments in an informal and conversational manner,
and both accurately described what the jury would hear. After
opening statements, Mr. Smith proceeded with the State's case. It
was a simple case, requiring only about three hours to present.
When the manager confronted Doe and asked him why he refused
to pay for the drink which he had by then consumed, Doe became
rude and insolent. The manager and three eye-witnesses testified
Doe took the goblet in his left hand and smashed it into the right
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side of the manager's face. According to these witnesses, the
goblet shattered upon impact, inflicting the injuries at that moment.
Doe testified that when the manager confronted him, it was she
who acted rudely. He admitted that they exchanged words, but he
testified repeatedly that he "did not want any trouble." Rather
than create a disturbance he decided to leave. He said that while
walking toward the exit at which he was looking, he placed the
goblet on a tray the manager was carrying. He testified he next
heard his brother say, "She's cut!" whereupon he turned around
and saw her bleeding. He could only surmise that she must have
quickly raised the tray as he was placing the goblet on it, thereby
striking herself in the face with the goblet. The manager and the
three eye-witnesses testified, however, that she was not carrying a
tray. Doe explained that he fled the premises because he feared attack by the white patrons.
Doe's brother had returned to his service in the Army by the
time of trial and therefore did not testify. Two assistants with the
Big U football program testified that Doe was a fine young man.
After the testimony by the assistants, the defense rested its case.
The trial began on Wednesday morning, and all the evidence
was presented by the end of the day. On Thursday morning, we
received the court's instructions and heard final arguments. The
prosecutor's closing argument lasted less than ten minutes. He
enumerated the elements of the offense of aggravated battery and
argued that the State had proved each element beyond reasonable
doubt. Although he urged us to convict Doe of that offense, he explained that even if we doubted that Doe touched the manager
with intent to injure her, we could convict Doe of simple battery if
we were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Doe intended
to touch the manager in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. Mr.
Williams argued for approximately twenty minutes, spending
almost all of his time on the element of intent. He reiterated Doe's
version of the facts and urged us to conclude that the
prosecution's version of the events was both confused and improbable. The jury began deliberating before noon.
The Deliberations
After we received the instructions and heard the final
arguments, we returned to the jury room, accompanied only by
the bailiff. The bailiff instructed us to select a foreman, repeated
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the judge's explanation of the verdict forms, left pencils and
paper, and offered to provide various amenities.
After about ten awkward seconds of looking at each other, two
or three of the jurors asked me to serve as foreman; one said I
should do so since I was the "expert." I told them that in this matter I was no more of an expert than they were, and I announced
my preference not to serve as foreman. I know that Smith and
Williams expected me to be the foreman, and I would have been
had I not declined the position. I felt I could not relegate myself to
the role of a mere observer; that would amount to shirking my duty as a juror. Yet, I felt no obligation to wield all the influence my
status as a lawyer gave me in the eyes of my fellow jurors. Thus, I
decided to intervene only when I felt in conscience that the jury
was moving toward what I believed to be an "unjust" result.
Three others, two women and one man, all middle-aged, were
asked by various jurors to agree to serve as foreman. Each of
them declined; they gave no reason, and none was requested. Two
of the three, despite declining the position, would later actively
participate in the discussion. Finally, a female student in her late
twenties, a woman who acted more sophisticated than her appearance seemed to warrant, volunteered to serve as foreman
since, as she explained, she already had experience as foreman in a
trial a few weeks earlier. No one objected, even though it was apparent she was not the most popular juror. Just minutes earlier
while the bailiff was delivering coffee, she mentioned the offensiveness of excessive smoking before half the jurors lit cigarettes.
No vote was taken to select the foreman; however, a few nodded
approvingly of her "candidacy." Consequently, the female student proceeded to assume the role of foreman.
The foreman proposed that we take a preliminary vote by secret
ballot. This, she explained, "seemed to work well" with the
previous jury. We had been instructed on the charges of both aggravated battery and battery, so we voted by secret ballot on both
simultaneously. On the first vote, ten voted to acquit and two to
convict Doe of aggravated battery; seven voted to convict and
five to acquit him of battery. After the votes were tallied and announced, the foreman asked someone voting each way to explain
his position.
One of the jurors explained that he had voted to acquit on aggravated battery because he did not believe that Doe intended to
injure the manager. Another, a forceful and defiant man in his
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mid-thirties, wearing cowboy boots and a dress shirt with sleeves
rolled up near his shoulders, voted to acquit because he believed
the "woman caused the whole thing." No one was willing to speak
in favor of convicting Doe on this count. It was apparent that Doe
would not be convicted of aggravated battery. A vote was quickly
taken on this count by a show of hands, and the jury unanimously
voted to acquit Doe of aggravated battery.
The jury's agreement to acquit on the aggravated battery count
was correct, and the first juror who spoke understood the issue
correctly. The prosecution had not established beyond a
reasonable doubt that Doe struck the manager with the intent to
injure her, which is an element of the offense of aggravated battery. The evidence indicated it was quite possible that Doe meant
to touch or slap the manager in a rude manner without hurting
her. Because he misjudged his proximity to her, Doe arguably
caused the harm inadvertently. The discussion that would ensue
regarding the lesser offense of battery indicates that the jurors
possessed a number of different rationales for acquitting Doe on
the charge of aggravated battery. From these diverse rationales
emerged a consensus on the charge of aggravated battery.
However, the discussion on the lesser offense lasted over two
hours. At least four more votes were taken; four minds were
changed with the jury eventually becoming hung when nine voted
to acquit and three to convict on the charge of battery.
For me, the case was relatively straightforward. It was clear to
me, beyond reasonable doubt, the manager was not carrying a
tray. In the absence of a tray, there was no possible explanation
for her injury except that it was inflicted by the impact of Doe's
hand holding the goblet upon her face. So, did Doe intend to touch
or apply force to the manager in a rude, insolent, or angry manner,
which is the essence of the offense of battery? The severity of the
manager's injuries left little doubt that the touching was accomplished by considerable force. Since all the witnesses but Doe
said both the manager and Doe were arguing vigorously, it was
reasonably inferred that this touching occurred in a rude, insolent,
or angry manner. But did the prosecutor prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the touching occurred intentionally?
Perhaps Doe merely tried to throw ice in the manager's face, misjudged the distance, and struck her with the goblet inadvertently.
Would ice put in motion by Doe constitute "intentional
touching"? Neither the prosecution nor the defense discussed the
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question. Late in the deliberations, when I was one of only three
still willing to vote to convict Doe of battery, I briefly wavered on
this point. However, when I reminded myself that no evidence
presented at trial supported the ice-throwing scenario I imagined
and that Doe's own explanation depended on the "imaginary"
tray that no other witness saw and which the manager logically
would not have carried, the only reasonable conclusion was that
Doe, with intent, and in a rude, insolent, and angry manner, struck
the manager on the face with the goblet and thereby injured her.
During the discussion in the jury room on whether to convict
Doe of battery, about half the jurors spoke actively and often;
perhaps three more spoke occasionally; and the rest did not speak
at all. The discussion was often aimless. On more than one occasion, the black juror interrupted the discussion with an interesting anecdote about his own life. Sometimes, when discussion
became vigorous, more than one person spoke at once, resulting in
two or three simultaneous conversations.
The reasons jurors offered to support their votes were diverse.
The juror who voted to acquit Doe of aggravated battery because
"the woman started the whole thing" maintained this position in
the discussion on the battery charge. At least one other juror was
persuaded by this logic. A juror who held out for a conviction correctly explained that her rudeness gave Doe no privilege to strike
her, but this analysis was not persuasive to the two jurors. The
black man seemed predominately moved by the fact that Doe's
father, whom he knew, was "a fine man" and that Doe's family
''was a good one."
The juror who carried several ink pens in his pocket was inclined
to articulate elaborate scenarios of how the injury might have happened. Late in the deliberations, he offered an explanation of the
events, accompanying his description with elaborate gestures. He
concluded that "as he (Doe) swung around with the glass, she
could have moved in a defensive motion with the tray forcing the
goblet into her eyes." When asked why he thought she was carrying a tray, he simply said that was what he believed. Several other
jurors were convinced, to my amazement, that she was carrying a
tray, even though Doe was the only one of five eye-witnesses who
saw it.
Several questions on "legal matters" were directed to me. One
juror asked me how long a sentence Doe would receive if convicted. She was concerned because he had only one more semester
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to complete before graduating from college. Another juror asked
whether the charge was a felony and the length of time such
sentences entailed. I declined to answer these questions, explaining that sentencing is for the judge and that severity of a possible
punishment is irrelevant to the issues raised in the instructions.
But some of the jurors refused to disregard the punishment question. One juror recalled correctly that Mr. Williams said in his
closing argument that the jury should deliberate carefully because
the offenses were "serious" and the offense of aggravated battery
was "very, very serious." The defense attorney's statement,
which was nearly objectionable, hit its intended target. One juror,
who argued that the length of a likely sentence should not influence us, even asked me if the defense attorney's statement was
improper; I merely smiled for a response. Some jurors were also
perplexed by the standard pattern instruction on intent; one asked me for a "legal interpretation of the meaning of intent." I
answered that intent means what the instruction says it means.
These jurors, though not satisfied with my answer, seemed resigned to the uncertainty of the situation.
Surprisingly, it was the youngest juror, the man in his twenties
who had been Doe's high school classmate and who now worked in
an ice cream shop, who made the most moving "speech" on Doe's
behalf. This juror was an unlikely candidate for the title of "most
influential juror," as his sloppy dress and late return from lunch
which delayed the proceedings on the previous day would hardly
seem to put him in favor with his collegues. Yet, his speech for
Doe appeared to lock up the nine votes for acquittal, making a
hung jury inevitable. Speaking with great sincerity and emotion,
the young man said: "I've seen him play high school football for
three years and Big U football for four years. I've seen him get hit
again and again by those big guys on the field and I've never seen
him lose his temper, not once. I can't believe he hit her intentionally with the goblet." Some discussion followed, but it was clear no
minds would be changed.
The discussion became embroiled in minute details of the event,
and recollections of the testimony on these points varied greatly.
To resolve some of the disagreements, the jury decided to ask the
judge to order those portions of the transcript containing
testimony about the confrontations between Doe and the manager
to be read back to the jury. The judge declined this request, saying that it would "elevate that testimony too much." After three
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hours of deliberation, without hope of a unanimous verdict, the
jury advised the judge that it was unable to reach a verdict. The
judge discharged the jury and declared a mistrial.
Impressions
As a not-so-average juror, I paid close attention to the dynamic
of jury decision-making. I was left with several impressions.
The jury was conscientious. During my eight weeks of jury service, I heard many complaints about long waits and other inconveniences. But when the time came to decide Doe's fate, the
members of the jury took their task seriously and performed it
conscientiously. I am certain that the time the judge took at the
beginning of the eight-week period of service to instruct the jurors
about the role of the jury in our system of justice and to instill in
them a sense of civic duty contributed to the seriousness with
which the jury performed its responsibility.
It is harderthan most attorneys realize for a jury to comprehend
and absorb the evidence. State v. Doe involved a fairly simple set
of facts. All of the evidence was presented in a few hours; many of
the facts were undisputed. Both attorneys realized that State v.
Doe was relatively straightforward, but the attorneys, particularly the prosecutor, overestimated the ability of the jury to understand the situation. This fact impressed me in a related way: attorney performance makes a substantialdifference in the outcome
of litigation.
An epitome of these two observations exists in the prosecutor's
elicitation of testimony describing the scene of the alleged crime.
When the first witness for the State began to describe the events,
the prosecutor asked him to make a drawing of the bar's floorplan
on the chalkboard in the courtroom. Even though I had been in
the bar myself, the rough chalk drawing the witness quickly
sketched was difficult to understand. At least two stairways,
three landings, a cashier's window, and the exit were important
locations. The prosecutor presumably thought his case so
straightforward that it was unnecessary to spend much time
describing the scene. After all, how could the manager have received such a serious injury if Doe had not struck her intentionally in
the face with the goblet? What could be more obvious? However,
once some jurors decided that the manager was holding a tray, the
angles from which various witnesses saw the events became important. The exact positioning of Doe and the manager was essen-
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tial to effective analysis of proffered alternative scenarios explaining how the manager was injured. The rough chalk drawing, ambiguous and imprecise when drawn, became the chart on which
each subsequent witness marked certain locations and events.
When the time came for the jury to reconstruct what happened,
the diversity of opinion as to what each witness had said about the
events was substantial, which made it difficult to reach a consensus.
Additionally, the prosecutor, with such a straightforward case,
thought it unnecessary to spend much time developing evidence
of Doe's intent to batter the manager. Each prosecution eyewitness was asked, "Did Doe intend to strike her?" The defense
attorney made no objection to these questions, and each witness
answered "yes." The questions were asked and the answers were
given quickly. Probably no other juror understood the legal importance of the element of intent before receiving the instructions. By
the time the jury began deliberating, the evidence on intent consisted of a few obscure questions and answers. Little was done to
develop the fierceness of the argument, the expressions on the
faces, the loudness of the voices, and the turmoil of the scene,
from which an inference of intent would be logical. With the element of intent given so little attention in the evidence, eventually
nine of the jurors were convinced that the manager's injury had
been an accident. The prosecutor's overestimation of the jury's
ability to understand the case very nearly resulted in an acquittal.
Once a juror has served on a jury in any given period of service,
the juror should be relieved of furtherduty. For some of the jurors,
State v. Doe was their second or third jury trial in six weeks. All of
this was discovered by the attorneys during voir dire, but near the
end of the jury service period, there were very few jurors who had
not had a recent jury experience. A number of the jurors had served together on previous panels, and many of these jurors were fairly well-acquainted from simply sitting and talking together each
time they were ordered to come to the courthouse. I believe that
some of these jurors had preconceptions regarding whose opinion
they would respect in the jury room. In addition, some of them
referred to what had happened in a previous trial as a basis for
comparing the state's case against this particular defendant.
Our foreman had served as a foreman just a few weeks earlier.
She encouraged particular procedures in the jury room because
they had worked well in a previous case. Some of the jurors were
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"savvy": they thought themselves sufficiently well-acquainted
with the meaning of, for example, "reasonable doubt" that they
could explain to first-time jurors the nature of the standard, thus
depriving the jury of the full-fledged discussion that should typify
collective decision-making.
My experience convinced me that the one day/one trial system
of jury service is much preferable. In addition to reducing the
economic hardship on some jurors as well as the need for the court
to accept hardship excuses, the system reduces the possiblity that
a jury verdict will be affected by one or more juror's perception of
some aspect of a prior trial.
Permittingjurors to take notes would not render the decisionmaking process any more arbitrarythan it already is. In State v.
Doe, the jury was not permitted to take notes during the trial.
Presumably the judge agreed with traditional criticisms that the
jurors who take notes will possess undue influence during
deliberations even though the notes may be inaccurate or
misleading, and that notetaking causes some jurors to miss important pieces of evidence while writing something else down. While
there is something to each of these concerns, it is difficult for me
to get excited about them if a typical jury is inclined to decide
whether a defendant battered a victim based upon that person's
prior behavior in football games or on who started the verbal argument that led to the physical assault. The extra weight given to inaccurate notes cannot be measurably worse than the extra weight
given to the inaccurate memory of a juror with a forceful personality. In some instances, notetaking could help the jury recall
exactly what was said by a witness while testifying. In State v.
Doe, where basic disagreements among jurors existed concerning
what was said, piecing together notes taken by various jurors
might have been helpful.
The same criticism applies to the judge's decision in State v.
Doe not to let the jury hear portions of the transcript because that
would "elevate that testimony too much." What the jury sought
to do was resolve a disagreement about what particular witnesses
said. Encouraging the jury to resolve such disagreements without
resort to the official transcript is likely to result in a verdict based
on testimony recharacterized by the juror who is the more skillful
advocate or who has a more forceful personality. Such a decision is
surely more arbitrary than one which "gives too much weight" to
transcribed testimony.
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My other reactions are more tentative. The difficulty which the
jury had in State v. Doe in understanding a fairly simple case
gives me concern about any jury's ability to understand complex
litigation. I am inclined to think that the jury's collective ability
to recall testimony is rather slight, but I make this observation
cautiously because much of the confusion in State v. Doe could
have been eliminated by a clearer presentation of the evidence.
Nevertheless, nothing in my experience as a juror called into question my previous belief that juries tend to act in an unprincipled
manner in complex trials.
It did occur to me, however, that my sense of "principled decision making," indeed, my sense of justice, is possibly skewed
simply because I am a lawyer. I have been taught that a principled, fair, and "just" decision is one based on the evidence
presented in the record. This is the essence of due process and a
fair trial. Decisions made on considerations outside the record are
arbitrary and presumptively unfair. It occurred to me that
"justice" might be something more vague and elusive, something
as simple as what juries actually do. Juries decide cases based on
some subjective, collective sense of what is proper under the circumstances. In a society where values are often allocated according to wealth or power, perhaps there is a place for the kind of
"justice" that juries do, as irrational as that "justice" may seem
to the lawyer whose client is humbled by an adverse verdict or to a
lawyer who, like me, has the opportunity to participate directly in
a jury's decision-making process.
Epilogue
When the jury was discharged, the judge told us we could
discuss the trial or our deliberations with anyone, as we chose.
Some of the jurors apparently spoke with reporters thereafter
because Leeville newspapers accurately reported some aspects of
the deliberations. I received a call from my good friend who practices with Mr. Williams, and I discussed my impressions of the
trial with him. I suspect that other jurors received similar calls.
After the mistrial was declared, a new trial was scheduled in
State v. Doe. Before the second trial, Doe pleaded guilty to the
charge of battery. He was sentenced to three months in the
Leeville jail.

